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ABC V. AEREO: HOW THE SUPREME COURT’S FLAWED
RATIONALE WILL IMPLICATE PROBLEMS IN NEW
TECHNOLOGIES
Collette Corser*
The Copyright Act promotes the creation and progress of arts by
protecting original works, such as by guaranteeing copyright
holders the exclusive right to publicly perform their works. In an
age of rapid technological development, courts have often
struggled with how to best interpret and apply this public
performance right to providers who stream broadcast television
programs over the Internet. A central question in this debate is
what constitutes a “performance” under the Copyright Act. This
Recent Development explores the Supreme Court’s latest attempt
at defining this issue, and argues that its decision in American
Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. only further confuses
this area of law and poses problems for other emerging
technologies, including cloud storage and sharing technologies.
I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Copyright Act to promote the progress of
useful arts by protecting original works.1 Despite this clear and
noble purpose, the meaning of copyright infringement under the
Act has been a point of contention and has thus led to various
results across jurisdictions. 2 This summer, the Supreme Court
*
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Development, particularly Keta Desai, Kyle Evans, Kelly Morris, and Nicholas
Turza.
1
17 U.S.C. § 102 (2010). See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“To promote
the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors
and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”).
2
See Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. Cablevision Systems Corp. Holdings,
Inc. (Cablevision), 536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that defendant
Cablevision’s RS-DVR service did not directly infringe on movie and television
copyright holders’ rights); WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc., 691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012)

1
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again addressed the issue of copyright infringement and attempted
to clarify this ambiguity in their opinion of American Broadcasting
Companies, Inc. v. Aereo, Inc.3
The Court considered whether Aereo, an online streaming
service, infringed on the exclusive right of certain copyright
holders when it sold subscribers a service allowing them to stream
and watch television programs over the Internet at almost the same
time as the programs were broadcast over the air.4 The plaintiff
copyright owners included television producers, marketers, distributors,
and broadcasters who owned the copyrights to many programs that
Aereo’s system streamed to its subscribers.5 Plaintiffs brought suit
seeking a preliminary injunction, arguing that Aereo was
infringing on their right to “perform” their copyrighted works
“publicly.”6 The Court looked to the Copyright Act, which grants
owners the exclusive right to perform their copyrighted works
publicly. 7 The Court sought to determine: (1) whether Aereo’s
system constitutes a performance under the meaning of the word as
the act defines it, and if so, (2) whether that performance is public.8
Relying heavily on congressional intent, the Court held that Aereo
did perform the copyrighted works publicly and was thus liable for
infringement.9 However, this decision was not unanimous. Justice
Scalia authored a dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito,
criticizing the majority’s ad hoc approach and offering a textual
argument for applying a volitional-conduct test to determine
defendant’s liability.10

(holding that defendant ivi was not a cable system); Fox Television Stations,
Inc. v. BarryDriller Content Systems, PLC, 915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal
2012) (granting a preliminary injunction to the broadcast network against
BarryDriller’s system, which is very similar to Aereo’s system, in a copyright
infringement claim).
3
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
4
Id. at 2503.
5
Id.
6
Id. at 2503–04.
7
17 U.S.C § 106(4) (2012).
8
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2504.
9
Id. at 2511.
10
Id. at 2517.
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This Recent Development argues that the Court’s opinion
misinterprets the Copyright Act. By using an ad hoc and
ends-justify-the-means rationale, the majority gives too much
discretion to lower courts in determining technically complex cases.
The better approach is the dissent’s bright-line volitional-conduct
analysis, which would provide courts with a clear way to interpret
copyright cases involving complex technologies. Part II sets forth
the facts of Aereo and prior development of the Copyright Act.
Part III examines the majority’s rationale and proposes
complications that will arise because of the majority’s approach.
Part IV predicts the impact this holding will have on new
technologies and Part V concludes with recommendations for how
to address future cases of copyright infringement.
II. BACKGROUND
Aereo’s system operated by assigning each subscriber his own
antenna, which transmitted a copy of the subscriber’s requested
program to him via an Internet connection.11 In Aereo, the Supreme
Court addressed whether Aereo’s system infringed on the
television broadcasters’ exclusive right to publicly perform their
works, as defined by the Copyright Act.12 The Copyright Act does
not specifically address technology identical to that employed by
Aereo, and similar systems have been subject to varying
interpretations by lower courts.13
A. The Specifics of Aereo’s Online Service
Aereo’s system transmitted broadcast television programs to its
subscribers over the Internet.14 Understanding of the specifics of
Aereo’s operations is best achieved by looking at both the subscriber’s
perspective and the technical, or “behind the scenes” perspective.15

11

See discussion infra Part II.A.
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503.
13
See discussion infra Part II.C.
14
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 680 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’d,
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
15
Id.
12
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From a subscriber’s point of view, Aereo provided the
functionality of both a standard television and a DVR because
Aereo’s system allowed subscribers to watch, record, and/or pause
live television using an Internet-connected device.16 When a subscriber
logged into his Aereo account, he could access a guide of
broadcast television programs. 17 Depending upon whether the
program had already aired, the subscriber could choose to either
“Watch” or “Record” the selected program. 18 If the subscriber
choose to watch the program, he could pause, rewind, or record the
program as he viewed the show.19 If the subscriber chose instead to
record a program, Aereo saved a copy of that program for later
viewing, which the subscriber could choose to playback at his
convenience.20 The difference between the “Watch” and “Record”
feature was that a program viewed with only the “Watch” function
was not retained for later viewing.21
From a technical perspective, Aereo’s system was comprised
of servers, transcoders, and several large antenna boards housed in
a central warehouse.22 Each board contained approximately eighty
antennas, which consisted of two dime-sized metal loops.23 In total,
thousands of such antennas spanned the warehouse.24 When an
16

Id. at 681–82 (“[U]sers can watch Aereo programming on a variety of
devices. Aereo’s primary means of transmitting a program to a user is via an
Internet browser, which users can access on their computers. Aereo users can
also watch programs on mobile devices such as tablets or smart phones using
mobile applications.”).
17
Id. at 681.
18
Id.
19
Id.
20
If a subscriber selects a program that will air in the future, the “Record”
function is his only option. In this case, Aereo will record the program when it
airs, saving a copy for the viewer to watch at his convenience. Id.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 682; Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503
(2014).
23
WNET, 712 F.3d at 682 (noting that these antenna boards are installed
parallel to each other in the warehouse in such a way that the antennas extend
out in order to receive the television broadcast signals. Thus, Aereo’s facility
uses thousands of individual antennas to receive the broadcast television
signals.).
24
Id.
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Aereo subscriber selected a program to either watch or record, that
selection sent a signal to Aereo’s server. 25 The server initially
assigned one of the individual antennas and a transcoder to the
subscriber, and it tuned the antenna to the broadcast frequency of
the requested program. 26 The server next transcoded 27 the data
received by the antenna, buffered the data, and sent the data to
another server where a copy of the program was saved in a
subscriber-specific folder on Aereo’s hard drive. 28 This process
allowed Aereo to save a subscriber-specific copy of the program.29
When the subscriber chose to only watch, and not record, his
selected program, Aereo’s server began to stream the saved copy
of the program after several seconds of the program had been
saved.30 Once the program ended, if the subscriber had only chosen
the “Watch” function, Aereo automatically deleted that copy of the
program.31 If the subscriber only selected to record the program,
the copy of the program was saved in the subscriber’s folder for
later viewing.32
25

Id.
Id.
27
Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2503 (2014)
(explaining that transcoding refers to the process in which signals received by
the antenna are translated into data that can be transmitted over the Internet).
28
WNET, 712 F.3d at 682–83. (“Three technical details of Aereo’s system
merit further elaboration. First, Aereo assigns an individual antenna to each user.
No two users share the same antenna at the same time, even if they are watching
or recording the same program. Second, the signal received by each antenna is
used to create an individual copy of the program in the user’s personal directory.
Even when two users are watching or recording the same program, a separate
copy of the program is created for each. Finally, when a user watches a program,
whether nearly live or previously recorded, he sees his individual copy on his
TV, computer, or mobile-device screen. Each copy of a program is only
accessible to the user who requested that the copy be made, whether that copy is
used to watch the program nearly live or hours after it has finished airing; no
other Aereo user can ever view that particular copy.”).
29
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2503 (2014) (finding that rather than sending the
program directly to the subscriber, “a server saves the data in a subscriber-specific
folder on Aereo’s hard drive,” creating a personal copy of the program for
subscriber”).
30
Id.
31
WNET, 712 F.3d at 682.
32
Id.
26
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B. Text of the Copyright Act
Congress revised the 1909 Copyright Act in 1976, shortly after
the Supreme Court issued two opinions addressing cable-television
technology.33 In Fortnightly Corp. v. United Artists Television Inc.34
and Teleprompter Corp. v. Columbia Broadcasting System, Inc.,35
the Supreme Court held that the cable television systems in
question did not infringe on copyright holders’ rights because the
systems did not “perform” the works as defined by the then-current
1909 Copyright Act. 36 In response to these holdings, Congress
enacted the 1976 Copyright Act, which is still in effect today.37
The 1976 Copyright Act grants the owner of a copyright
various exclusive rights including the right to perform their work
publicly.38 This section also gives the owner of a copyright the
exclusive right to authorize another party to publicly perform their
33

Thomas M. Carter, The Copyright Act and the Frontier of “Television”:
What to do About Aereo, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 97, 103–04 (2014) (citing
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 685 (2d Cir. 2013)) (discussing
the results of Fortnightly and Teleprompter, where the Supreme Court
determined that there was no public performance because the 1909 Copyright
Act did not contain a section comparable to the current Transmit Clause).
34
392 U.S. 390 (1968).
35
415 U.S. 394 (1974).
36
Fortnightly, 392 U.S. at 399–401; Teleprompter, 415 U.S. at 408. See also
WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 685 (2d Cir. 2013), rev’d, Am.
Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (“[The Fortnightly and
Teleprompter] decisions held that under the then-current 1909 Copyright Act,
which lacked any analog to the Transmit Clause, a cable television system that
received broadcast television signals via antenna and retransmitted these signals
to its subscribers via coaxial cable did not ‘perform’ the copyrighted works and
therefore did not infringe copyright holders’ public performance right.”).
37
H.R. REP. NO. 94-1476, at 63 (1976) (“Under the definitions of ‘perform,’
‘display,’ ‘publicly,’ and ‘transmit’ in section 101, the concepts of public
performance and public display cover not only the initial rendition or showing,
but also any further act by which that rendition or showing is transmitted or
communicated to the public. Thus, for example . . . a cable television system is
performing when it retransmits the broadcast to its subscribers.”). See WNET,
712 F.3d. at 685; 17 U.S.C. §§ 104, 111(d) (2012).
38
17 U.S.C. § 106(4) (2012) (“[T]he owner of a copyright under this title has
the exclusive rights to do and to authorize . . . in the case of literary, musical,
dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and motion pictures and other
audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work publicly.”).
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works.39 The Copyright Act further defines “perform” as “to recite,
render, play, dance, or act, either directly or by means of any
device or process or, in the case of a motion picture or other
audiovisual work, to show its images in any sequence or to make
the sounds accompanying it audible.”40 Congress added what is
known as the “Transmit Clause” to the Copyright Act, which
defines a public performance as transmitting or otherwise
communicating a performance of a copyrighted work to the public
by means of any device or process.41
The Copyright Act also requires copyright holders and cable
companies that retransmit the copyrighted works to enter into
compulsory licensing agreements under § 111.42 Within this section,
Congress defines cable systems that would be subject to these
licensing agreements as any facility that receives transmitted
signals or programs broadcasted by a Federal Communications
Commission (“FCC”) licensed station and makes secondary
transmissions of those signals to subscribing members of the
public that pay for such service.43
Today, the Copyright Act thus provides copyright holders the
exclusive right to publicly perform their works. It also states that
39

Id.
17 U.S.C. § 101 (2012).
41
Id. (“To perform or display a work ‘publicly’ means . . . to transmit or
otherwise communicate a performance or display of the work to a place
specified by clause (1) or to the public, by means of any device or process,
whether the members of the public capable of receiving the performance or
display receive it in the same place or in separate places and at the same time or
at different times.”) (emphasis added).
42
17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1) (2012) (“[S]econdary transmissions to the public by a
cable system of a performance or display of a work embodied in a primary
transmission made by a broadcast station licensed by the Federal Communications
Commission or by an appropriate governmental authority . . . shall be subject to
statutory licensing”).
43
17 U.S.C. § 111(f)(3) (2012) (“A ‘cable system’ is a facility, located in any
State, territory, trust territory, or possession of the United States, that in whole
or in part receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast by one or more
television broadcast stations licensed by the Federal Communications
Commission, and makes secondary transmissions of such signals or programs by
wires, cables, microwave, or other communications channels to subscribing
members of the public who pay for such service.”).
40
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transmitting copyrighted works constitutes a performance, while
providing a compulsory licensing scheme for providers that meet
the Act’s definition of cable systems.
C. Judicial Interpretations of the Copyright Act
After the 1976 amendments, interpretation of the public
performance right as applied to new and emerging technologies
has varied by jurisdiction. For instance, in Cartoon Network LP,
LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc.44 (“Cablevision”), the Second Circuit
held that defendant Cablevision’s new Remote Storage Digital
Video Recorder system (“RS-DVR”) did not infringe on the
copyright holder’s exclusive right to publicly perform their
works.45 The RS-DVR system allowed Cablevision customers “to
record cable programming on central hard drives housed and
maintained by Cablevision at a ‘remote’ location. RS-DVR
customers [could] then receive playback of those programs through
their home television sets, using only a remote control and a
standard cable box equipped with the RS-DVR software.”46 Thus,
the RS-DVR service was much like a traditional DVR service,
allowing customers to store recorded programs on an internal hard
drive and play them back at their own convenience.47 However,
there was one difference from traditional DVR services: instead of
storing the copyrighted programs on an internal hard drive, the
RS-DVR service would store the programs at a Cablevision
facility.48 The Second Circuit concluded that each transmission was
private because each individual subscriber made transmissions
through his own personal copies.49 Since each transmission was
private, the Second Circuit held that Cablevision could not be

44

536 F.3d 121 (2d Cir. 2008).
Id. at 123.
46
Id. at 124.
47
Id. at 123–24.
48
Id. at 124.
49
Id. at 137–38 (finding that the “universe of people capable of receiving an
RS-DVR transmission is the single subscriber whose self-made copy is used to
create that transmission”).
45
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publicly performing the copyrighted works and thus was not liable
for copyright infringement.50
In WPIX, Inc. v. ivi, Inc.,51 the Second Circuit addressed whether
ivi, which admitted to violating plaintiffs’ public performance
rights, was a cable system entitled to the compulsory licensing fee
under § 111 of the Copyright Act. 52 ivi’s system operated by
capturing and retransmitting plaintiffs’ copyrighted television
programs live over the Internet to its subscribers.53 The Second
Circuit first examined the plain language of § 111, and finding it
inconclusive regarding the Internet, then turned its focus to
legislative intent.54
In examining the legislative history of the 1976 Copyright Act,
the Second Circuit found that Congress’s intent was not to include
Internet transmissions under § 111’s licensing scheme.55 Specifically,
the Second Circuit concluded that legislative history indicated that
Congress enacted § 111 to address the issues of poor television
reception in certain areas by allowing licensing programs that
would support local systems to provide cable to these areas.56 The
Second Circuit also acknowledged that if Congress had intended
for the compulsory licensing agreements to apply to the Internet, it
would have explicitly included such Internet transmissions in the

50

Id. at 139 (concluding that the RS-DVR “transmissions are not performances
‘to the public,’ and therefore do not infringe any exclusive right of public
performance”).
51
691 F.3d 275 (2d Cir. 2012).
52
Id. at 278–79.
53
Id. at 277–79 (noting that within 5 months after its launch, ivi offered over
4,000 of plaintiffs’ copyrighted television programs to its subscribers).
54
Id. at 280 (“Based on the statutory text alone, it is simply not clear whether
a service that transmits television programming live and over the Internet
constitutes a cable system under § 111.”).
55
Id. at 282.
56
Id. at 281 (citing U.S. Copyright Office, Satellite Home Viewer Extension
and Reauthorization Act Section 109 Report 1 (2008) (“SHVERA Report”))
(concluding that Congress enacted § 111 to enable cable systems to provide
service to more geographic areas while offering broadcasters protection to
incentivize their continued broadcasts).
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statute.57 Finally, the Second Circuit cited the Copyright Office’s
statement “that Internet retransmission services are not cable systems
and do not qualify for § 111 compulsory licenses.”58 Pursuant to its
conclusion that ivi was not a cable system, the court upheld the
injunction preventing ivi from streaming copyrighted programs.59
Later that year, in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v.
Aereo, Inc. 60 (“Aereo I”), the Southern District of New York
applied Cablevision and held that Aereo did not infringe on the
rights of copyright holders to publicly perform their works. 61
There, the court found that Aereo’s system, which allowed
subscribers to view plaintiffs’ copyrighted works over the Internet,
was analogous to Cablevision’s because each subscriber was
assigned his own antenna, so it was not a public transmission.62
Instead, each recording was made individually at each subscriber’s
request.63
Contrast Aereo I to a case decided later that same year, Fox
Television Stations, Inc. v. BarryDiller Content Systems, PLC.64 In
BarryDriller, a California court had to determine whether BarryDriller’s
system, which was similar to Aereo’s, infringed on the plaintiffs’
copyrighted works.65 In determining whether BarryDriller should
be subject to a preliminary injunction, the district court noted the
57

See id. (noting that Congress codified a separate statutory license for
satellite carries (the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1998) and also amended
§ 111’s language in 1994 to expressly include microwaves).
58
Id. at 283, (quoting U.S. Copyright Office, A Review of the Copyright
Licensing Regimes Covering Retransmission of Broadcast Signals 97 (1997)).
59
Id. at 285.
60
874 F. Supp. 2d 373 (S.D.N.Y. 2012), rev’d, 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014).
61
Id. at 375.
62
Id. at 385–86 (“As in Cablevision, the functionality of Aereo’s system from
the user’s perspective substantially mirrors that available using devices such as a
DVR or Slingbox, which allow users to access free, over-the-air broadcast
television on mobile internet devices of their choosing.”).
63
Id. at 386.
64
915 F. Supp. 2d 1138 (C.D. Cal 2012).
65
Id. at 1140–41 (“Plaintiffs accuse Defendants of offering their copyrighted
content through internet and mobile device streaming. Defendants do not deny
that they retransmit Plaintiffs’ copyrighted broadcast programming, but argue
that their service is legal because it is technologically analogous to the service
which the Southern District of New York found to be non-infringing.”).

16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 1, 11
ABC v. Aereo
differing approaches taken by the Second Circuit and the Ninth
Circuit in deciding infringement cases.66 The court refused to apply
the Second Circuit’s approach, which held that transmissions of
individual copies do not infringe on the public performance right.67
Instead, the BarryDriller court focused on whether the defendant’s
system was performing the work at all, irrespective of the specific
copy of the work from which the transmission was made. 68
Rejecting the Second Circuit’s approach, the court held that
BarryDriller was infringing on Fox’s copyrighted works and
granted a preliminary injunction.69
The District of Columbia Circuit next decided Fox Television
Stations, Inc. v. FilmOn X LLC,70 with Fox arguing that FilmOn
should be held liable based on the BarryDriller decision.71 FilmOn
responded that following Cablevision, its system was not liable for
copyright infringement because it does not publicly perform the
copyrighted works.72 The district court decided for Fox, acknowledging
that although it was not bound by either the Second Circuit’s
decisions or California’s BarryDriller ruling, it “f[ound] BarryDriller
to be more persuasive.”73 In concluding that the Copyright Act

66

Id. at 1145 (“The Second Circuit’s focus is also in tension with precedent in
the Ninth Circuit.”).
67
Id. at 1144 (characterizing the Second Circuit’s reasoning as “unless the
transmission itself is public, the transmitter has not infringed the public performance
right”).
68
Id. (“Again the concern is with the performance of the copyrighted work,
irrespective of which copy of the work the transmission is made from.”).
69
Id. at 1149.
70
966 F. Supp. 2d 30 (D.D.C. 2013).
71
Id. at 32.
72
Id. FilmOn specifically responded that its system was modeled after the
approved system from the Cablevision decision. It assigned each subscriber an
individual antenna, thus creating a one-to-one relationship. FilmOn asserted that
this process did not infringe on the plaintiffs’ exclusive right to publicly perform
its copyrighted works and so it was not liable for copyright infringement. Id.
73
Id. at 33 (“The Court has carefully considered the rulings in Cablevision
and Aereo II, but it is not bound by them or by the California court's ruling in
BarryDriller, although the Court finds BarryDriller to be more persuasive.”).
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prohibits FilmOn’s retransmission services, the court granted a
preliminary injunction against its services.74
Despite these two consecutive findings of infringement in the
Ninth and D.C. Circuits, in WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo,75 the Second
Circuit applied Cablevision’s interpretation of the Transmit Clause
and held that Aereo was not liable for infringement.76 In applying
Cablevision, the Second Circuit used a four-part inquiry to
determine whether to award a preliminary injunction.77 First, it
considered the potential audience of the transmission.78 Second, it
recognized the rule that private transmissions should not be
aggregated.79 Third, it acknowledged an exception to the second
rule, finding that private transmissions generated from the same
copy of the work may be aggregated.80 Finally, it accepted any
other factor that limited the potential audience of a transmission as
a relevant fact to the Transmit Clause analysis.81 Using these four
guidelines, the Second Circuit determined Aereo’s system was
analogous to the RS-DVR system in Cablevision and thus not
liable for infringement.82 Aereo’s potential audience was the single
user who requested the program to be recorded, and thus it was not
74

Id. (“This Court concludes that the Copyright Act forbids FilmOn X from
retransmitting Plaintiffs’ copyrighted programs over the Internet. Plaintiffs are
thus likely to succeed on their claim that FilmOn X violates Plaintiffs’ exclusive
public performance rights in their copyrighted works. Because there is no
dispute of fact between the parties . . . the Court will grant Plaintiffs’ motion for
a preliminary injunction.”).
75
712 F.3d 676 (2d Cir. 2013).
76
Id. at 696.
77
Id. at 689.
78
Id. (acknowledging “if the potential audience of the transmission is only
one subscriber, the transmission is not a public performance, except as discussed
[in subsequent factors]”).
79
Id. (“It is therefore irrelevant to the Transmit Clause analysis whether the
public is capable of receiving the same underlying work or original performance
of the work by means of many transmissions.”).
80
Id. (“In such cases, these private transmissions should be aggregated, and if
these aggregated transmissions from a single copy enable the public to view that
copy, the transmission are public performances.”).
81
Id. (quoting Cartoon Network LP, LLLP v. CSC Holdings, Inc. (Cablevision),
536 F.3d 121, 137 (2d Cir. 2008)).
82
See id. at 690.
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a public transmission.83 Like the RS-DVR service, Aereo created
unique copies of every program an individual subscriber wished to
perform.84 Additionally, when an Aereo user chose to watch a
program, the transmission he viewed was generated from his
unique copy; no other user received that copy.85
Judge Chin authored a dissent calling Aereo’s technology “a
sham” and “over-engineered in an attempt to avoid the reach of the
Copyright Act and to take advantage of a perceived loophole in the
law.” 86 In reaching his conclusion, Judge Chin examined the
statutory text of the Copyright Act and the legislative intent in
enacting the Transmit Clause,87 finding a critical difference between
Aereo’s and Cablevision’s services: Cablevision’s underlying cable
system was authorized.88 Cablevision paid statutory licensing and
retransmission fees and its subscribers were able to view television
programs in real-time.89 The only issue in Cablevision was the
supplemental RS-DVR service, which allowed subscribers to store
the already authorized programs for later viewing.90 Judge Chin’s
dissent highlighted how this difference created a stark contrast to
Aereo’s system, as Aereo paid no fees and its retransmissions were
unauthorized.91

83

Id. at 689–90.
Id.
85
Id. at 690.
86
Id. at 697 (Chin, J. dissenting) (“The system employs thousands of individual
dime-sized antennas, but there is no technologically sound reason to use a
multitude of tiny individual antennas rather than one central antenna; indeed, the
system is a Rube Goldberg-like contrivance, over-engineered in an attempt to
avoid the reach of the Copyright Act and to take advantage of a perceived
loophole in the law.”).
87
Id. at 698 (Chin, J., dissenting) (finding explicitly that to transmit a
performance is to communicate it by any device or process, so Aereo’s system
fit squarely within the statute’s plain meaning).
88
See id. at 697 (Chin, J., dissenting).
89
Id. at 701 (Chin, J., dissenting).
90
Id. (Chin, J., dissenting).
91
Id. at 702 (Chin, J., dissenting).
84
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III. THE MAJORITY’S FLAWED RATIONALE FOR ITS HOLDING
Judicial interpretation and application of the Transmit Clause
to Internet-streaming services has resulted in two conflicting
views, namely the Second Circuit approach, which focused on the
potential audience capable of receiving the transmission, and the
Ninth Circuit approach, which focused on whether the allegedly
infringing service “performed” at all. The Supreme Court’s grant
of certiorari in Aereo gave hope that the Court would provide
guidance and bring clarity to this area of copyright law, but
unfortunately its rationale only further confuses this issue. In
deciding this case, the Court looked to two separate questions
under the Copyright Act: (1) whether Aereo performed, and (2) if
so, whether the performance was public.92
A. Did Aereo Perform Publicly as Defined by the Copyright Act?
The majority in Aereo determined that Aereo did perform as
defined by the Copyright Act.93 First, the majority acknowledged
that the congressional intent in enacting the 1976 amendments was
“to bring the activities of cable systems within the scope of the
Copyright Act.”94 The Court then held that Aereo was not just an
equipment provider, but rather that its “activities [were]
substantially similar to those of the CATV companies that
Congress amended the [Copyright] Act to reach.”95 In coming to
this conclusion, the Court acknowledged that the systems at issue
in both Teleprompter and Fortnightly—the two Court cases that
preceded Congress’s passage of the 1976 Copyright Act—varied in
one significant aspect from Aereo: those systems transmitted
copyrighted material constantly while Aereo’s system only transmitted
broadcasted programs when requested by a subscriber.96 However,
the Court disregarded this difference, finding instead that because
of “Aereo’s overwhelming likeness to the cable companies targeted
by the 1976 amendments, this sole technological difference between
92

Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2504 (2014).
Id. (“We conclude that Aereo is not just an equipment supplier and that
Aereo ‘perform[s].’”).
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Id. at 2506.
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Id. at 2507.
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Aereo and traditional cable companies does not make a critical
difference here.”97 Accordingly, the Court held Aereo’s program to
constitute a performance.98
The majority built their opinion upon a foundation of flawed
reasoning. One major flaw is the majority’s dismissive conclusion
that Aereo’s system constituted a performance within the meaning
of the Copyright Act. The majority seemingly substitutes actual
interpretation of the statutory text with a conclusion based upon a
“guilt by resemblance”99 analysis.100 By concluding that Aereo was
similar to a cable company without actually classifying it as one
subject to the § 111 compulsory licensing agreements, the majority’s
reasoning seems to be based almost entirely on the view that
Aereo’s system was similar to the original cable television systems
Congress sought to regulate through the 1976 amendments. Based
on this looks-like-cable-TV standard, the majority concluded that
because Aereo looked like a cable system, it should be held liable
for infringement.101
Nothing in the plain language of the Copyright Act indicates
that Aereo’s program was illegal. For copyright infringement, parties
may be guilty of infringing on a theory of direct or secondary
liability.102 In direct liability cases, the defendant engages in the
infringing conduct.103 In contrast, secondary liability occurs when a
97

Id. (“Insofar as there are differences [between Aereo and the original cable
television systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter], those differences concern
not the nature of the service that Aereo provides so much as the technological
manner in which it provides the service.”).
98
Id.
99
Id. at 2515 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100
The majority examined the congressional intent of the 1976 amendments to
the Copyright Act, and found that these changes were made to bring activities of
cable systems within the scope of the Act. The majority then determined that
Aereo’s activities were “substantially similar to those of CATV companies that
Congress amended the Act to reach” and used this reasoning to find that Aereo’s
activities constituted a performance within the meaning of the Transmit Clause.
Id. at 2506.
101
Id. at 2517 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing Sony Corp. of America v.
Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 433 (1984)).
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See id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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defendant is held liable for infringement by a third party even if the
defendant was not a party to the infringing activities.104 In Aereo,
American Broadcasting Company (“ABC”) claimed that Aereo was
directly infringing on their copyrighted works, so Aereo should
have been found liable only if it met the standard of direct
infringement.105
Aereo should not have been held liable for copyright infringement
because it did not meet the standard of direct infringement. This
standard is met “only if [Aereo had] engaged in volitional conduct
that violates the Act.” 106 Such volitional conduct requires the
defendant to have directed its conduct to the copyrighted
material.107 The language of the Copyright Act directly supports
this proposition, as demonstrated by its consistent use of the active
voice in describing an infringer’s actions directed towards the
copyrighted work.108 The question in this case is who is responsible
for performing the copyrighted work: Aereo or its subscribers?109
In using Aereo’s services, the subscribers performed the copyright
holders’ copyrighted works.110 Aereo’s system responded to the
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Secondary liability applies when a defendant “intentionally induc[es] or
encourage[s] infringing acts by others or profits from such acts while declining
to exercise a right to stop or limit [them].” Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(quoting Metro-Goldwyn Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913,
930 (2005)).
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Id. at 2514–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[The Network’s] request for a
preliminary injunction—the only issue before this Court—is based exclusively
on the direct-liability portion of the public performance claim.”) (citing App. to
Pet. for Cert. 60a-61a).
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Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (citing 3 W. PATRY, COPYRIGHT §9:5.50
(2013)).
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Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting “[e]very Court of Appeals to have considered
an automated-service provider’s direct liability for copyright infringement has
adopted that rule”).
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Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting the Act “defines ‘perform’ in active,
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Id. at 2512 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Id. at 2514 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (noting that “[t]he key point is that
subscribers call all the shots”).
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subscriber’s program request: its servers, transcoders, and antennas
were indifferent to the material that is transmitted.111
In order to be liable for direct infringement, the volitional-conduct
standard requires that Aereo must have “trespassed on the
exclusive domain of the copyright owner” itself. 112 The dissent
illustrates this requirement by explaining the core difference
between a copy-shop and a video-on-demand service.113 In copy
shops, the customer chooses the material to be copied, so the shop
cannot be held liable if a customer makes an infringing copy.114 In
contrast, a video-on-demand service, such as Netflix, chooses and
arranges available materials for its subscribers. This arrangement
by Netflix constitutes a volitional act.115 Aereo differs from Netflix
because it did not provide subscribers with a prearranged assortment
of programs.116 Instead, Aereo assigned each subscriber his own
antenna, and the subscriber chose to use that antenna to access
whatever broadcasts were available over the air, some of which
were copyrighted and others which were not.117 Since Aereo did
not select the content of the programs to be transmitted, it should
not be held liable for directly infringing on ABC’s copyrights.
Another difference highlighted by the Netflix analogy is that
video-on-demand services perform “to the public,” while Aereo
did not. After Netflix selects the works it wants to perform, it
purchases copies of those works and transmits the copy to its
subscribers upon request.118 When different subscribers choose the
same video, they receive an individual transmission of that work,
but when Netflix generates that transmission from the same single
copy that Netflix purchased.119 Thus, although the specific transmission
111

See WNET, Thirteen v. Aereo, Inc., 712 F.3d 676, 682 (2d Cir. 2013),
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See Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2513 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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to each subscriber is private, Netflix uses one copy to transmit the
same program to numerous different subscribers. In contrast, each
of Aereo’s transmissions was an individual program copy that Aereo
made upon user requests.120
The finding that Aereo’s subscribers, rather than Aereo itself,
performed does not mean that Aereo can escape secondary
infringement. In fact, the Court should hold Aereo liable for this
offense. But because the issue before the Court was only that of
direct liability, the Court should not have found Aereo liable for
copyright infringement through performing.121
B. Uncertainty Created by the Finding that Aereo is Performing
Publicly
The dissent summarized the flaws in the majority’s holding
with the following syllogism: “(1) Congress amended the Act to
overrule our decisions holding that cable systems do not perform
when they retransmit over-the-air broadcasts; (2) Aereo looks a lot
like a cable system; therefore (3) Aereo performs.”122 This rationale
injects uncertainty into future cases of copyright infringement by
contradicting settled jurisprudence of the bright-line volitional-conduct
test and by providing little criteria for determining future cases.123
The majority’s rationale was that because Aereo was similar to
a cable system, the majority should treat it as such to determine

134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461) (“In a video-on-demand service like
Netflix, the provider chooses audiovisual works, obtains copies of those works,
and offers to transmit performances of those works to any person agreeing to the
provider's terms. Numerous subscribers receive individual transmissions of the
same work generated at different times from the same copy.”).
120
See supra notes 23–29 and accompanying text.
121
Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 2514–15 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
122
Id.
123
See, e.g., CoStar Group, Inc. v. LoopNet, Inc., 373 F.3d 544, 550 (4th Cir.
2004) (“But to establish direct liability . . . [t]here must be actual infringing
conduct with a nexus sufficiently close and causal to the illegal copying that one
could conclude that the machine owner himself trespassed on the exclusive
domain of the copyright owner.”); see also Sony Corp. of America v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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whether it performs.124 Even accepting that rule, the Court has
provided no guidance for which factors contribute to determining
what qualifies as a cable-lookalike system.125 Does the program in
question have to store live broadcasts for future viewing at the
user’s discretion? Based on the ruling in Cablevision, this could
not be the standard, otherwise the RS-DVR service would also be
infringing.126 Alternatively, the proper criteria could be that if the
program offers access to live broadcasts via the Internet, it
constitutes performance. However, this also does not seem to be a
good working basis because of the potential for Aereo to simply
require users to wait a few minutes or more before streaming the
program to them.127
Based on these uncertainties, the test the Court seems to be
proposing is an ad hoc test to determine whether the totality of the
circumstances would indicate that a cable-like service is being
provided.128 However, that still leaves uncertainty in regards to the
traditional volitional-conduct requirements. Would this new ad hoc
test replace the bright-line volition test or would each stand alone,
based upon the discretion of the court hearing the case?
The majority’s refusal to provide a clear working standard for
interpreting and applying the Transmit Clause to new technologies
creates great uncertainty for determining future cases. The majority
acknowledged that its holding would affect future cases, yet chose
to ignore these implications.129 It instead deferred that decision to a
later date, when a specific new technology comes before the
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Aereo, 134 S. Ct at 2511 (finding that Aereo’s practices were “highly
similar to those of CATV systems in Fortnightly and Teleprompter,” and as
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Id. at 2516 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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Court.130 Specifically, the majority stated that questions involving
novel issues, such as cloud technology, “should await a case in
which they are squarely presented.”131 The Court has seemingly
punted the issues to lower courts to decide how to interpret future
copyright cases that fall outside the limited holding of the cablelookalike standard the majority proposed here. The Court’s
decision to defer future technologies to a later date is problematic
because it allows for this ongoing uncertainty in interpreting the
Copyright Act to persist on a case-by-case basis.
IV. IMPLICATIONS ON NEW TECHNOLOGY
Today, technology plays a vital role in society with advances
created at a constant and rapid pace. The Aereo decision is
important for providing guidelines to interpret the Copyright Act in
light of new technologies. Both of the parties from Aereo
addressed this argument, but the majority responded only by
declaring, “[w]e cannot now answer more precisely how the
Transmit Clause or other provisions of the Copyright Act will
apply to technologies not before us.”132 The majority acknowledged
that questions regarding emerging technologies would inevitably
arise, but instead of addressing these questions and providing a
standard for future courts to work with, the majority chose to
ignore this issue. 133 Accordingly, when determining copyright
liability for new technologies, future courts will have to apply the
majority’s reasoning to various technologies, even those that do
not fall into the majority’s “cable-lookalike” standard. This will
negatively impact the development and application of novel
technologies.
A. Effects on Cloud Computing
Cloud computing is an Internet-based system in which different
services, including networks, servers, storage, and applications, are
130
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delivered to various devices and users via the Internet.134 It allows
hardware to be moved off-site while retaining access through an
Internet connection, and is already in wide use nationally. Users
are able to access, share, and edit their stored data anywhere.135 The
virtual services offered through the cloud have shown measurable
economic value by creating thousands of new jobs and providing
trillions of dollars in increased revenues.136
Unfortunately, this important, growing industry is threatened
by the Court’s Aereo decision. For example, many individuals
currently use cloud services, such as Dropbox,137 to store their data.
Individual users store their data with Dropbox, and can
subsequently retrieve it at any time and place of their choosing.
Some of the users may even use Dropbox to store data identical to
that of other users, such as a copy of a television program, but each
user will have his own copy saved to his own Dropbox folder. Like
the programs transmitted by Aereo, Dropbox stores data in
different files, each for a specific user. When requested by an
individual user, Dropbox transmits the stored data to that user.
134

Peter Mell & Timothy Grance, The NIST Definition of Cloud Computing,
NAT'L INST. OF STANDARDS & TECH., U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SPECIAL
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There are various other such cloud storage technologies that provide the
same function as Dropbox, and all are similarly endangered by the majority’s
Aereo holding. The author only refers to Dropbox in this section of the paper for
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Dropbox is also indifferent to the content uploaded. Accordingly, a
user may upload an illegally obtained copy of a television program
to Dropbox access it later for viewing.
By refusing to differentiate between cloud technologies such as
Dropbox and cable systems similar to Aereo, the majority allows
the possibility for cloud technologies to fall victim to the same ad
hoc judgment of liability for direct copyright infringement. The
majority’s conclusion that Aereo directly infringed on ABC’s
copyrighted works was based on its finding that Aereo’s program
was similar to the cable television systems that Congress sought to
bring within the scope of the 1976 Copyright Act. 138 This
conclusion allows lower courts, in making future decisions
regarding cloud computing, to use the same totality of the
circumstances judgment as that used by the Aereo majority.139 In
such a case, a lower court could easily determine that like Aereo,
Dropbox publicly performs copyrighted works.
An example using a copyrighted television program
demonstrates this prediction. In such a case, an individual would
decide he wanted to watch a copyrighted program and could
download it in a variety of legal ways. Instead of saving that
program to his device’s personal hard drive, the user could upload
it to Dropbox for storage and access it when he desired. Another
individual deciding to download the same program, but through
illegal means, could also upload his copy to Dropbox for storage.
When either user wanted to watch the stored program at a later
time, he or she could log in to his or her respective Dropbox
account and access the stored program. The program viewed by
138

Aereo, 134 S. Ct. at 251 (“In sum, having considered the details of Aereo’s
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each user will be his own copy which he uploaded to Dropbox, and
even though the programs are identical, the first user will only
have access to his legally obtained program while the second user
will have access only to his illegally obtained program.
This scenario is very similar to that which Aereo proscribes,
and following the majority’s Aereo rationale, Dropbox could be
held liable for direct infringement. First, a court deciding
Dropbox’s case would need to determine whether or not Dropbox
performs within the meaning of the Copyright Act. Following the
majority rationale, the deciding court would consider whether
Dropbox fits the cable-lookalike standard that the majority noted
as a determinative factor in Aereo.140 However, without specific
guidelines for determining what this standard really entails, there is
room for interpretation. Although Dropbox’s primary function is to
offer users a cloud-based storage service and not to provide users
access to broadcast programs, the fact that customers can use the
program to stream broadcast programs could provide a lower court
with a basis for finding that Dropbox is performing. This
possibility is dangerous because it allows for useful cloud
computing technologies to fall victim to direct copyright
infringement, which would result in a chilling effect on the
development of such technologies that have already had, and
continue to have, beneficial effects on our economy.
The traditional volitional-conduct test that the Aereo dissent
endorses is a better approach to this hypothetical. This approach
gives courts clear guidance in applying the Copyright Act to
different technologies rather than forcing them to interpret the
Copyright Act in light of each new technology. With the Dropbox
example, a court need only ask whether Dropbox’s service has
engaged in volitional conduct directed towards copyrighted
material. Here, the answer is unequivocally no. Dropbox only
provides its users cloud-storage facilities and is indifferent to the
data content that its users store. Finding that Dropbox does not
perform under the volitional-conduct test, a court need not decide
140
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whether such performance is public. This explicit guideline
provides courts with a standard to apply, ensures uniformity in
copyright interpretation in new technologies, and avoids costly
litigation that comes with the majority’s ad hoc approach.
The importance of cloud technology to society is undisputed. It
is a digital service that is already in high demand and has the
potential for significant economic growth.141 The continued growth
of cloud computing however depends on an interpretation of the
Copyright Act that does not threaten cloud services with costly
litigation that accompanies direct infringement suits. By refusing
to explicitly hold that cloud services are not subject to the same
subjective cable-lookalike test established in Aereo, the majority
created the potential for future confusion in interpreting the
Transmit Clause to cloud computing technology.
B. Growing Market for Aereo-Like Services
The traditional cable industry is a generally anticompetitive
market, with only one or two companies dominating any specific
geographic region.142 The lack of choice in cable providers has
forced many consumers to obtain services through these
providers,143 despite their consistent ranking at the bottom of the
American Consumer Satisfaction Index.144 In such a market, many
consumers would welcome an alternative to traditional cable
companies. The FCC even favors such consumer autonomy,
evidenced by its published guidelines detailing how consumers can
141

See Gantz et al., supra note 136, at 2.
John Cassidy, We Need Real Competition, Not a Cable-Internet Monopoly,
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Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498 (2014) (No. 13-461) (“The ACSI rates consumer
satisfaction using a model that includes such factors as the reasonableness of
pricing, the availability of features, and the quality of customer service. Cable
providers have earned a reputation for being unresponsive to customer demand
and heedless of customer complaints.”).
142

16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 1, 25
ABC v. Aereo
access free over-the-air broadcast signals.145 To take advantage of
these over-the-air signals, consumers must purchase their own
home equipment, which averages about $700.146 In addition to the
initial equipment cost, customers are responsible for installing and
maintaining these systems, which many consumers lack the
technical ability to do.
By providing a service that allows users to view broadcasted
programs without subscribing to a cable company, Aereo
capitalized on the growing “cable cutting” market. This market
comprises of consumers who have found alternative ways to view
television programs without paying for a cable subscription.147 One
of the greatest selling points of the cable cutting industry is the low
cost. Although consumers still needed an Internet connection,
Aereo’s service cost only $8 per month.148 Similar services are
comparable in price with Netflix costing only $8.99 per month for
new members. 149 These prices are significantly lower than the
average cable bill, which was reported to be $64.41 per month.150
145
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However, Aereo provided unique services that Netflix and other
similar providers, such as Hulu Plus and Amazon, do not: Aereo
allowed subscribers to watch programs nearly-live and gave access
to live sports broadcasts.151
The success of Aereo, prior to the Court’s decision, and other
similar services demonstrates that there is a true market for
cable-television alternatives. In fact, both HBO and CBS have
recently announced plans to offer Internet streaming of their live
programs as well as past shows on demand. 152 These recent
announcements demonstrate that cable companies are noticing and
responding to a shift away from traditional cable packages and
towards more convenient, on-demand, and cost effective Internetstreaming options.
By holding that Aereo performed copyrighted works, the
majority chills the development of services that threaten the
traditional anticompetitive cable television market. Although a
movement away from the cable market continues, as evidenced by
CBS and HBO’s recent Internet-streaming option and the growing
numbers of “cable cutters,” most Internet-based television
providers do not offer the ability to watch programs online in
real-time or to watch live sports programs. Aereo, in contrast,
offered both. If the majority held instead that Aereo’s program did
not constitute a performance, its operations would have been
allowed to continue, and would have motivated the anticompetitive
cable monopolies to respond. Such a response would have
benefitted consumers, most likely by lowering costs, providing
more varied package options, or simply improving their customer
services.153
INT’L BUS. TIMES (May 20, 2014), http://www.ibtimes.com/cable-bills-risingamid-comcast-twc-merger-scrutiny-fcc-media-bureau-report-shows-pay-tv-1587304.
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http://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/17/business/cbs-to-offer-web-subscriptionservice.html?_r=1.
153
An example of how competition improves this market is visible in
Google’s introduction of Google Fiber to Kansas City. There, Time Warner

16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. ON. 1, 27
ABC v. Aereo
V. RECOMMENDATIONS
The majority’s holding that Aereo is directly liable for
copyright infringement injects confusion into future Copyright Act
interpretations. To remedy this uncertainty, (1) Congress can
respond by enacting new legislation to specifically address services
such as Aereo’s, (2) lower courts can find Aereo to be subject to
the compulsory licensing scheme of § 111, or (3) the FCC can
propose its own remedy, as it is an agency that commonly
regulates cable-provider technologies.
A. How Congress Can Fix Aereo
In cases of new and emerging technologies, the courts should
defer “to Congress when major technological innovations alter the
market for copyrighted materials.”154 If the majority had applied
the volitional-conduct test in Aereo, its rationale would have
conformed to prior jurisprudence, and validated the Second
Circuit’s interpretation as the correct standard in these Transmit
Clause cases. That, in turn, would have allowed Congress to step in
and address the issue of online streaming and copyright
infringement. Instead, the Court chose to find infringement by an
ad hoc “guilt by resemblance” test. 155 That decision provides little
guidance for lower courts in deciding future cases.
The Legislature is the branch of government best suited to
introduce new interpretation of the Copyright Act in relation to
novel technologies. In the past, Congress has not hesitated to act
when it believed a new innovation required a new legal
interpretation. For example, when the Eleventh Circuit held that a
satellite carrier was a cable system entitled to § 111 compulsory
licensing, Congress responded by codifying a separate statutory
Cable almost immediately doubled its Internet speeds and offered up to seventy
percent reductions in prices. See Lauren K. Ohnesorge, Will Google Fiber Mean
Lower-Cost Time Warner Cable Service?, CHARLOTTE BUS. J. (Feb. 21, 2014),
http://www.bizjournals.com/charlotte/blog/morning-edition/2014/02/willgoogle-fiber-mean-lower-cost-time-warner.html.
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Am. Broad. Cos., Inc. v. Aereo, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2498, 2515 (2014) (Scalia,
J., dissenting).
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licensing provision for satellite carriers. 156 More recently, the
House Judiciary Committee Chairman announced the initiation of
a comprehensive review of U.S. copyright law, paying particular
attention to updates necessary in light of new technologies. 157
Additionally, several legislative proposals before Congress would
alter the legal structure at issue here.158 One such proposal is the
Consumer Choice in Online Video Act, which expressly permits
equipment rental like that offered by Aereo, while exempting such
rental services from certain retransmission fees.159
The efforts taken by Congress in the past to remedy improper
legal classification of technologies demonstrate its capability in
this field of law. Its current review of national copyright law and
its present consideration of several legislative bills addressing
systems similar to Aereo’s demonstrate that Congress recognizes
the importance of these issues. As such, Congress should either
enact new legislation, like it did for satellite carriers, or amend the
current legislation to explicitly address this issue.
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B. Specifically Addressing Internet Services within § 111
By holding Aereo liable for copyright infringement because it
resembles the cable television services Congress sought to bring
under the scope of the Transmit Clause, without actually defining
it as a cable system within § 111,160 the Court injects uncertainty
into future Copyright Act interpretation.
A solution to this problem is to include Internet transmissions
of broadcasted programs as cable systems within the meaning of
§ 111. The easiest way for courts to achieve this inclusion would
be to interpret such Internet transmissions as a “facility” within the
definition of cable systems.161 Unfortunately, the Copyright Office
has expressly refused to classify Internet services as cable systems
so they might receive the § 111 statutory licenses.162 Since the
Copyright Office is an expert to be respected in this area, future
courts will have a difficult time disregarding the Copyright
Office’s express assertion and reading in a definition of Internet
services to the text of § 111.
However, the Copyright Office’s statement was made over a
decade ago. And since then, Internet-based technologies have
improved, are more widely used, and contribute to our national
economy. Courts should find that the Copyright Office’s view is
antiquated, and as such, abandon it.
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C. Possibility of FCC Involvement
Because the FCC is involved in many aspects of regulating
cable television systems,163 looking to this agency for guidance is
another possibility. In fact, Aereo recently filed an ex parte notice
disclosing recent conversations with the FCC, where it requested
the FCC’s support for including a new category of online video
services with the FCC’s definition of a Multichannel Video
Programming Distributor.164 Specifically, services whose facilities
deliver subscribers linear channels of video programming would fit
this definition.165 This change would allow Aereo to operate like a
cable-TV provider, meaning a cable system within the § 111
definition, and thus help Aereo in seeking licenses and negotiating
for the rights to retransmit channels.166
VI. CONCLUSION
The majority decision in American Broadcasting Companies,
Inc. v. Aereo, Inc. further muddled an area of law that desperately
needed clarity. Both circuit and lower courts disputed the proper
way to interpret the public performance right of copyright holders
in cases of Internet services that streamed copyrighted broadcast
television programs to subscribers. Instead of providing clarity and
guidance to these contradictory lower court decisions, the Aereo
majority abandoned the volitional-conduct test for direct copyright
liability and chose an ad hoc and totality of the circumstances test
for determining whether an Internet system closely enough
resembled a cable system. Despite the majority’s assurance that its
holding would not deter future innovations of new technologies,
implications of this holding for cloud services and the cable cutting
market indicate otherwise. By refusing to give courts direction in
determining the legality of new technologies, the Court’s opinion
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interferes with the advancement and usage of cloud computing and
perpetuates cable monopolies.
However, there are options to remedy the negative effects of
the majority’s holding. For example, Congress could amend the
Copyright Act by including Internet providers in § 111’s definition
of cable systems subject to compulsory licensing agreements.
Congress could also enact new legislation that addresses this issue
specifically. Alternatively, lower courts could read Internet providers
into the § 111 definition of “facilit[ies],” despite the Copyright
Office’s prior statements to the contrary. Finally, the FCC could
take action by defining Aereo-like services as cable-like systems
under the Multichannel Video Programming Distributor definition,
allowing Aereo, and other similar systems, to pursue licensing
agreements and negotiations as Internet-based cable providers.

